Policymakers have been puzzled to observe that food stamp households appear more likely to be food insecure than observationally similar eligible nonparticipating households. We reexamine this issue allowing for nonclassical reporting errors in food stamp participation and food insecurity. Extending the literature on partially identified parameters, we introduce a nonparametric framework that makes transparent what can be known about conditional probabilities when a binary outcome and conditioning variable are both subject to nonclassical measurement error. We find that some prevailing conclusions in the food assistance literature hinge critically on implicit assumptions about the nature and degree of classification errors in the data.
Introduction
The largest food assistance program in the United States, the Food Stamp Program is ". . . the most critical component of the safety net against hunger (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1999, p.7)."While this program provides basic protection for citizens of all ages and household status, the safety net is especially important for children who comprise over half of all recipients (Cunnyngham and Brown, 2004) . Given the cornerstone role of food stamps in ensuring food security, policymakers have been puzzled to observe that food stamp households with children are more likely to be food insecure than observationally similar nonparticipating eligible households. In response to a burgeoning interest in food insecurity, an extensive literature has developed in the last decade on the determinants and consequences of food insecurity in the United States The negative association between food security and food stamp participation has been ascribed to several factors including self-selection (those most at risk of food insecurity are more likely to receive food stamps), the timing of food insecurity versus food stamp receipt (someone might have been food insecure and then entered the Food Stamp Program), misreporting of food insecurity status, and misreporting of food stamp receipt. Previous work has studied these …rst two issues (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001 ; . The literature has not assessed the consequences of measurement error.
We focus on measurement error issues using data from the Core Food Security Module (CFSM), a component of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Speci…cally, we investigate what can be inferred when food stamp participation and food insecurity status may be misreported. As elaborated below, we extend the econometric literature on misclassi…ed binary variables by studying identi…cation when an outcome (in our case food insecurity) and a conditioning variable (food stamp participation) are both subject to arbitrary endogenous classi…cation error. We also consider the identifying power of assumptions that restrict the patterns of classi…cation errors. For example, misreported food insecurity status might arise independently of true food stamp participation status.
A number of studies have documented the presence of substantial reporting error in households'receipt of food stamp bene…ts. For example, using administrative data matched with data from the Survey of Income 1 and Program Participation (SIPP), Marquis and Moore (1990) found that about 19 percent of actual food stamp recipient households reported that they were not recipients. Underreporting of up to 25 percent has also been documented in comparisons between responses in surveys, such as the CPS, and administrative data (Cunnyngham, 2005) . Bollinger and David (1997 ) estimate econometric models of food stamp response errors and study the consequences of misreporting for inference on take-up rates.
The assumption of fully accurate reporting of food insecurity status can also be questioned. For example, some food stamp recipients might misreport being food insecure if they believe that to report otherwise could jeopardize their eligibility. 1 Alternatively, some parents may misreport being food secure if they feel ashamed about heading a household in which their children are not getting enough food to eat (Hamelin et al., 2002) .
More generally, some of the survey questions used to calculate o¢ cial food insecurity status (see Section 2) require the respondent to make a subjective judgment. Validation studies consistently reveal large degrees of response error in survey data for a wide range of self-reports, even for relatively objective variables. 2 As is well understood in the econometrics literature, even random errors can lead to seriously biased parameter estimates.
In this paper, we study inferences in an environment that allows for the possibility of misclassi…ed food stamp participation and food insecurity status. Extending the literature on misclassi…ed binary variables (e.g., Aigner, 1973; Bollinger, 1996; Bollinger and David, 1997, 2001 ; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2003; Kreider and Pepper, forthcoming), we introduce a nonparametric approach for assessing what can be inferred when binary outcomes may be misclassi…ed. In this environment, we allow for the possibility that food stamp participation errors are endogenously related to the food insecurity outcome. Our framework follows the spirit of Horowitz and Manski (1995) who study partial identi…cation under corrupt samples given minimal assumptions on the error generating process. 3 Within this environment, we derive sharp worst-case bounds that exploit all available information under 1 Other literatures contain lively debates about the extent to which self-reported disability might be in ‡uenced by a respondent's desire to rationalize labor force withdrawal or the receipt of disability bene…ts (see, e.g., Bound and Burkhauser, 1999) . 2 Black et al. (2003) , for example, …nd that more than a third of respondents to the U.S. Census claiming to hold a professional degree have no such degree, with widely varying patterns of false positives and false negatives across demographic groups. In matched data, Barron et al. (1997) …nd that the correlation between worker-reported training and employer-reporting training is less than 0:4 and Berger et al. (1998) report that more than a …fth of workers and their employers disagree about whether the worker was eligible for health insurance through the employer; see also Berger et al. (2000) .the maintained assumptions. To …rst isolate the identi…cation problem associated with potentially misreported food stamp participation, we begin our analysis by assuming that the food insecurity outcome is reported without error. As a reference case, we derive easy-to-compute sharp bounds on conditional food insecurity prevalence rates when food stamp misreporting arises independently of true participation status.
We show how to transform a computationally expensive multidimensional search problem into a series of single-dimension search problems that requires little programming e¤ort or computational time. We compare these bounds to those obtained under alternative assumptions on the nature of reporting error. For example, we can consider the possibility that respondents are prone to underreport but not overreport program participation. In the most general case, we make no assumptions about the patterns of classi…cation errors.
After studying the identi…cation problem for the case of fully accurate food insecurity responses, we consider the case that food insecurity as well as food stamp participation may be reported with error.
In the next section, we describe the central variables of interest in this paper -food insecurity and food stamps -followed by a description of the CFSM data. In Section 3, we highlight the statistical identi…cation problem created by the potential unreliability of the self-reported data. Applying and extending methods from a rapidly emerging literature on partially identi…ed probability distributions (see Manski, 2003 for a unifying discussion), Section 4 shows how conditional food insecurity prevalence rates can be partially identi…ed under various restrictions on the nature and degree of classi…cation errors. Section 5 presents our empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
Concepts and Data

Food Insecurity
The extent of food insecurity in the United States has become a well-publicized issue of concern to policymakers and program administrators. In 2003, 11:2% of the U.S. population reported that they su¤ered from food insecurity. As described below, these households were uncertain of having, or unable to acquire, enough food for all their members because they had insu¢ cient money or other resources. About 3:5% su¤ered from self-reported food insecurity with hunger. These households reported hunger at some time during the year because they could not a¤ord enough food. For households with children, the reported levels are higher -16:7% and 3:8% respectively.
To calculate the o¢ cial food insecurity rates in the U.S., a series of 18 questions are posed in the CSFM for families with children. (For families without children and for households with one individual, a subset of 10 of these questions are posed.) Each question is designed to capture some aspect of food insecurity and, for some questions, the frequency with which it manifests itself. Examples include "I worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more" (the least severe outcome); "Did you or the other adults in your household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn't enough money for food;" "Were you ever hungry but did not eat because you couldn't a¤ord enough food;" and "Did a child in the household ever not eat for a full day because you couldn't a¤ord enough food"(the most severe outcome). A household with children is categorized as (a) food secure if the respondent responds a¢ rmatively to two or fewer of these questions; (b) food insecure if the respondent responds a¢ rmatively to three or more questions; and (c) food insecure with hunger if the respondent responds a¢ rmatively to eight or more questions. 4 A complete listing of the food insecurity questions can be found in Nord et al. (2005) .
The CFSM questions are designed to portray food insecurity in the United States in a manner consistent with how experts perceive the presence of food insecurity. Given conceptual di¢ culties in quantifying food insecurity status, its measurement contains both objective and subjective components. 5 Such classi…cations are thus akin to classi…cations of work disability insofar as work capacity involves both objective factors (e.g., the presence of a medical condition) and subjective factors (e.g., the ability to function e¤ectively despite the presence of the condition). 6 For reasons described above, a household's food insecurity status might be misclassi…ed relative to the profession's intended threshold for true food insecurity.
The Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Program, with a few exceptions, is available to all families with children who meet income and asset tests. To receive food stamps, households must meet three …nancial criteria: a gross-income test, 4 The label "food insecurity with hunger"has been criticized by some for its measure of well-being at the household level rather than at the individual level (National Research Council, 2006). We nevertheless focus on this measure because it continues to be utilized as a descriptor in the o¢ cial statistics of food insecurity in the United States (e.g., Nord et al., 2005) . We treat food insecurity as a binary indicator in this paper consistent with how it is generally de…ned by researchers and policymakers. We do not attempt to address conceptual issues about how food insecurity should be ideally quanti…ed. 5 Consistent with the subjective nature of the questions in the CFSM, Gundersen and Ribar (2005) …nd that selfreported food insecurity has a substantially higher correlation with a subjective measure of food expenditure needs than with an objective measure of such needs. 6 See, for example, Bound (1991 7 Net income is calculated by subtracting a standard deduction from a household's gross income. In addition to this standard deduction, households with labor earnings deduct 20 percent of those earnings from their gross income. Deductions are also taken for child care and/or care for disabled dependents, medical expenses, and excessive shelter expenses. 8 Examples of such costs include travel time to a food stamp o¢ ce and time spent in the o¢ ce, the burden of transporting children to the o¢ ce or paying for child care services, and the direct costs of paying for transportation. method, researchers can identify both false positive errors of commission (i.e., reporting bene…ts not actually received) and false negative errors of omission (i.e., not reporting bene…ts actually received). Using data from the SIPP, Bollinger and David (1997, Table 2 ) …nd, consistent with aggregate reports, that 0:3 percent of households have errors of commission while 12:0 percent have errors of omission.
Data
Our analysis uses data from the December Supplement of the 2003 CPS. The CPS is the o¢ cial data source for poverty and unemployment rates in the U.S. and has included the CFSM component at least one month in every year since 1995. In 2003, this component was included in the December Supplement. The December CPS also contains information on food stamp participation status. We limit our sample to households will children eligible for the Food Stamp Program based on the gross income criterion. Our sample of 2707 observations consists of all households with children reporting incomes less than 130 percent of the poverty line.
9 Table 1 displays joint frequency distributions of reported food insecurity status and food stamp participation among eligible households. Panel A shows that 52:3% of eligible households with children who reported the receipt of food stamps also reported being food insecure. Among eligible households who did not report the receipt of food stamps, 34:4% reported being food insecure. Based on these responses, the prevalence of food insecurity is 17:9 percentage points higher among food stamp recipients than among nonrecipients.
Based on analogous information in Panel B, the prevalence of food insecurity with hunger is 6:5 percentage points higher among food stamp recipients (15:9%) than among nonrecipients (9:4%). In what follows, we assess what can be inferred about these conditional prevalence rates when food stamp participation and food insecurity status are subject to classi…cation errors. 9 Our data do not contain su¢ cient information for us to apply the net income test or asset test. However, virtually all families meeting the gross income test also meet the net income test. The asset test could be important for a sample that includes a high proportion of households headed by an elderly person (Haider et al., 2003) . For households with children, however, the fraction asset ineligible but gross income eligible is small. Using combined data from 1989 to 2004 in the March CPS (which does have information on the returns to assets), Gundersen and O¤utt (2005) …nd that only 7:1% of households are asset ineligible but gross income eligible. 6 
Identi…cation
To assess the impact of classi…cation error on inferences, we introduce notation that distinguishes between reported food stamp participation status and true participation status. Let X = 1 indicate that a household truly receives food stamps, with X = 0 otherwise. Instead of observing X , we observe a self-reported counterpart X. A latent variable Z indicates whether a report is accurate: Z = 1 if X = X, with Z = 0 otherwise. Finally, let Y = 1 denote that a household reports being food insecure, with Y = 0 otherwise. Initially, we focus exclusively on food stamp misclassi…cations and assume that food insecurity status is measured without error. We later allow for the possibility of misclassi…cations in both food stamp participation and food insecurity status.
Taking self-reports at face value, we can point-identify the food insecurity prevalence rates among food stamp recipients and nonrecipients as 0:523 and 0:344, respectively (Table 1A ) -a di¤erence that is statistically signi…cant at better than the 1% level. Allowing for the possibility of classi…cation errors, however, we cannot identify P (Y = 1jX ) even if reporting errors are thought to occur randomly. To formalize the identi…cation problem, consider the rate of food insecurity among the true population of food stamp recipients.
This conditional probability is given by
Since one does not observe X , neither the numerator nor the denominator is identi…ed. 10 However, assumptions on the pattern of reporting errors can place restrictions on relationships between the unobserved quantities. Let 
where
Worst-case bounds on P (Y = 1jX ) are obtained by …nding the extrema of equations (2) and (3) 
For example, the fraction of food insecure households that falsely reports receiving food stamps obviously cannot exceed the fraction of food insecure households that reports receiving food stamps.
Before considering any structure on the pattern of false positives and false negatives, we begin by assessing identi…cation given a limit on the potential degree of misclassi…cation. Following Horowitz and Manski (1995) and the literature on robust statistics (e.g., Huber 1981), we can study how identi…cation of an unknown parameter varies with the con…dence in the data. Consider an upper bound, q, on the fraction of inaccurate 8 food stamp participation classi…cations: P (Z = 0) q which implies (v )
This assumption incorporates a researcher's beliefs about the potential degree of data corruption. If q equals 0 (as is implicitly assumed in all previous work on food insecurity), then P (Y = 1jX ) is pointidenti…ed because all food stamp participation reports are assumed to be accurate. At the opposite extreme, a researcher unwilling to place any limit on the potential degree of reporting error can set q equal to 1. In that case, there is no hope of learning anything about P (Y = 1jX ) without constraining the pattern of reporting errors. In any event, the sensitivity of inferences on P (Y = 1jX ) can be examined by varying the value of q between 0 and 1.
In the "corrupt sampling" case in which nothing is known about the pattern of reporting errors, we compute sharp bounds on P (Y = 1jX ) using a result from Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming). After brie ‡y presenting these bounds, we derive a narrower set of bounds obtained under the assumption that classi…cation errors arise independently of true participation status. We also consider the identifying power of other assumptions. For example, we assess what can be known about these parameters under an asymmetric errors assumption that households may underreport food stamp participation but do not falsely report receiving bene…ts. This assumption is consistent with the evidence discussed above regarding errors of omission and errors of commission (Bollinger and David, 2001 ). After establishing sets of bounds on P (Y = 1jX ) for the case that food insecurity is accurately reported, we allow for the possibility that food insecurity status may also be misreported. Throughout this analysis, we do not impose the nondi¤erential errors assumption embedded in the classical errors-in-variables framework. 
Corrupt sampling bounds
Under arbitrary errors (corrupt sampling), the researcher makes no assumptions about the patterns of false positive and false negative classi…cations. We can compute closed-form sharp "degree" bounds in this environment with the following:
"Corrupt Sampling Degree Bounds" (Kreider-Pepper, forthcoming, Prop. 1): Let P (Z = 0) q.
Then the prevalence of food insecurity among food stamp participants is bounded sharply as follows:
using the values + = Analogous bounds for the prevalence of food insecurity among nonrecipients, P (Y = 1jX = 0), are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0 and vice versa in each of the relevant quantities.
Naturally, these bounds can be narrowed if the researcher is willing to make assumptions that restrict the pattern of reporting errors. Suppose, for example, that the researcher believes that food stamp participation is potentially underreported but households do not falsely claim to receive food stamps. In this case, we can (2) and (3). The sharp lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) is attained when 1 = 0 and 0 = min fq; p 00 g while the sharp upper bound is attained when 0 = 0 and 1 = min fq; p 10 g.
Similarly, the sharp lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 0) is attained when 0 = 0 and 1 = min fq; p 10 g while the sharp upper bound is attained when 1 = 0 and 0 = min fq; p 00 g. We thus derive the following closed-form "no false positives" bounds:
"No False Positives Bounds": Let P (Z = 0) q and suppose that households do not falsely report the receipt of food stamps. Then the conditional food insecurity prevalence rates are bounded sharply as follows: 
The assumption of no false positive reports does not always improve all of the bounds. For example, suppose that the allowed degree of classi…cation error is small enough that q min fp 00 ; p 11 p 01 g. In this case, the lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) under the assumption of no false reports is identical to the lower bound under corrupt sampling.
Orthogonal participation errors
Many studies have assumed that classi…cation errors arise independently of the variable's true value (see Molinari (2005) for a discussion). Bollinger (1996) , for example, discusses the possibility that a worker's true union status has no in ‡uence on whether union status is misreported in the data. Kreider and Pepper (2006) impose the identifying assumption that, among certain types of respondents, misreported disability status does not depend on true disability status. In the present context, this independence assumption implies that misreporting of food stamp participation is orthogonal to true participation status:
In this case, the false positive and false negative classi…cation errors must satisfy the constraint:
Based on earlier discussion, there is reason to believe that food stamp reporting errors are not random.
Nevertheless, the orthogonality assumption is weaker than the usual assumption of no classi…cation errors, and it serves as a useful benchmark case for comparison.
Sharp bounds on the conditional food insecurity rates, P (Y = 1jX ), can be found by searching over all feasible combinations of + 1 ; + 0 ; 1 ; 0 in (2) subject to satisfying constraint (vi ). Computational costs associated with a simultaneous search over three of these four parameters (after imposing the constraint), however, can quickly become burdensome at high values of q -especially while bootstrapping to obtain con…dence intervals or when combining the independence assumption with other restrictions. 12 As we elaborate below, our Proposition 1 provides simple-to-compute bounds that require only single-dimension searches.
We begin by focusing discussion on deriving a lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1). Di¤erentiating (2) Combining these results with analogous results for upper bounds, we obtain the following proposition: 
where L inf fLB 1 ; LB 2 ; LB 3 ; LB 4 g and H sup fU B 1 ; U B 2 ; U B 3 ; U B 4 g. Analogous bounds on P (Y = 1jX = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0, and vice versa, in the relevant quantities.
The expressions for the upper bounds are provided in Appendix A. 13 The bounds converge to the selfreported conditional food insecurity rate P (Y = 1jX = 1) as q goes to 0. Increasing q may widen the bounds over some ranges of q but not others, and the rate of identi…cation decay can be highly nonlinear as q increases.
These bounds are easy to program, and computing time is trivial given that searches are conducted in a single dimension. To compute LB 1 , for example, we need only to search over feasible values of + 1 . In our application, computational speed for the Proposition 1 bounds at q = 0:5 is more than 3300 times faster than the speed associated with a simultaneous search across three of the four parameters 14 Moreover, the singledimensional search allows us to avoid specifying an arbitrary tolerance threshold for when independence is satis…ed. If the speci…ed tolerance is too small, the calculated bounds become arti…cially narrow as feasible bounds are excluded from consideration. In contrast, a large tolerance leads to unnecessarily conservative estimated bounds. In practice, we found it quite time-consuming to …nd a reasonable balance between speed and accuracy -a trade-o¤ that varies across di¤erent values of q. The proposed single-dimension search procedure e¤ectively avoids this problem.
Food insecurity classi…cation errors
To this point, we have con…ned our attention to classi…cation errors in food stamp participation. Modifying Equation (1), the true food insecurity prevalence rate among food stamp recipients is given by
Given the possibility of classi…cation errors in both X and Y , there are now many more types of error combinations. We represent these combinations by uv jk . The subscripts j and k indicate true food insecurity status and true food stamp participation status, respectively. Speci…cally, j = 1 indicates that the household is truly food secure (j = 0 otherwise), and k = 1 indicates that the household truly receives food stamps (k = 0 otherwise). The superscripts indicate whether these outcomes are falsely classi…ed, and if so, in which direction. Speci…cally, u ="+" indicates that the household is misclassi…ed as food insecure, u =" "
indicates that the household is misclassi…ed as food secure, and u ="o"indicates that food insecurity status is not misclassi…ed. Similarly, v ="+" indicates that the household is misclassi…ed as receiving bene…ts, v =" " indicates that the household is misclassi…ed as not receiving bene…ts, and v ="o" indicates that participation status is not misclassi…ed.
As before, we can decompose the numerator and denominator into observed and unobserved components: A search over all combinations of errors becomes rapidly burdensome as the values of q and q 0 are allowed to rise. Nevertheless, the problem is feasible for su¢ ciently low degrees of potential data corruption. For the case of corrupt sampling, the search problem is greatly simpli…ed because no structure is placed on the pattern of errors. In that case, many of the unknown parameters for each bound can be set to 0. X and/or Y , we cannot set any of the parameters to 0. Instead, we search over all feasible combinations of errors subject to the requirement that candidates for the bounds are discarded unless the appropriate orthogonality analogues to constraint (vi ) are satis…ed. 15 We next turn to empirical results. We …rst illustrate what can be identi…ed about conditional food insecurity prevalence rates under the assumption that the receipt of bene…ts may be misclassi…ed but food insecurity is accurately measured. We then allow for the possibility that food insecurity is misreported as well. We pinpoint critical values of allowed degrees of data corruption for when we can no longer identify that food stamp recipients are more likely to be food insecure than eligible nonrecipients.
Results
Food Stamp Classi…cation Errors
Figures 1 and 2 trace out patterns of identi…cation decay for inferences on the prevalence of food insecurity among food stamp recipients and nonrecipients, respectively, as a function of the allowed degree of data corruption, q. As discussed above, we focus our attention on eligible households with children. For these …gures, we assume that only food stamp participation is subject to classi…cation error; food insecurity classi…cations are presumed to be accurate.
In Figure 1 we examine what can be known about P (Y = 1jX = 1), the prevalence of food insecurity among food stamp recipients. When q = 0, all food stamp classi…cations are taken at face value; uncertainty about the magnitude of arises from sampling variability alone. As seen in Figure 1 and the table beneath it, the prevalence rate at q = 0 is point-identi…ed as The …gure traces out the 5th percentile lower bound and 95th percentile upper bound across values of q.
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The bounds naturally widen as our con…dence in the reliability of the data declines. When q rises to 0:10, (minimize) the expression in Equation (2) than would minimize (maximize) the expression in Equation (3). 1 6 We bootstrap to obtain these values using the bias-corrected percentile method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) using 1,000 pseudosamples. The kinks at various values of q re ‡ect the impacts of constraints (i )-(vi ) on allowed combinations of false positives and false negatives (Section 3). For su¢ ciently small values of q, constraints (i )-(iv ) are not binding because constraint (vi ) prevents Here, we …nd that identi…cation of the sign of breaks down when q is only 0:018 under corrupt sampling and when q is only 0:029 under orthogonal errors. Both of these are far lower than in the case of food insecurity. When the presence of false positive participation reports is assumed away, the critical value of q rises to 0:124 which is higher than for food insecurity. Again, these critical values are conservatively high in that they do not account for the additional uncertainty created by sampling variability. we …nd it di¢ cult to conclude that food insecurity is more prevalent among food stamp recipients than among eligible nonrecipients. Such a conclusion requires a large degree of con…dence in self-reported food participation status. In the next section, we extend the analysis to the case that both food stamp recipiency and food insecurity may be misclassi…ed.
Food stamp and food insecurity classi…cation errors
As discussed above, the possibility of classi…cation errors in food insecurity status further confounds identi…cation of the parameters of interest. Table 2 provides critical values for identi…cation breakdown that vary across di¤erent assumptions on the nature of classi…cation errors. Row A reproduces information highlighted in Figure 3A for the case of perfectly accurate food insecurity classi…cations. For the case of arbitrarily misreported food stamp recipiency in Column (i), the sign of is identi…ed to be positive unless more than 7:1% of households might misreport food stamp participation. These values rise to 8:2% and 9:1% for the cases of orthogonal errors and no false positive reports, respectively. Now suppose that food insecurity status might be misclassi…ed for up to 5% of households: q 0 = 0:05.
If potential food insecurity classi…cation errors arise independently of true food insecurity status (Row B), then the sign of cannot be identi…ed under arbitrary program participation errors unless it is assumed that fewer than 2:8% of households might misreport their food stamp recipiency. These critical values rise only slightly under the stronger assumptions of orthogonal food stamp errors (3:3%) and no false positive food stamp reports (4:1%). In Row C for the case of arbitrarily misreported food insecurity status, the critical values fall further to 2:1%, 2:4%, and 3:5%, respectively.
When Y = 1 is de…ned to classify food insecurity with hunger, yet smaller degrees of uncertainty about the data are su¢ cient to lose identi…cation of the sign of . Even assuming away the existence of classi…cation errors in food stamp recipiency (i.e., q = 0) and supposing that errors in Y arise independently of the variable's true value, the sign of is not identi…ed unless q 0 < 0:028 -an error rate of less than 3%. This critical value is conservatively large in that we have abstracted away from sampling variability. Collectively, these …ndings suggest that we should not be con…dent that food stamp recipient households are less likely to be food secure than nonrecipient households unless we are willing to place a very large degree of con…dence in the responses.
Conclusion
As the cornerstone of the federal food assistance system, the Food Stamp Program is charged with being the …rst line of defense against hunger. 
Case 2:
where 2 j h 0;
Case 3: Maximum allowed degree of reporting error in food stamp participation, q c , such that the sign of Δ is no longer identified for higher allowed error rates. Note: All critical values are conservatively large in that they are calculated based on point estimates of the bounds on Δ (instead of using 5 th percentile lower bounds as depicted in the figures). Critical values that account for the additional uncertainty associated with sampling variability would be smaller. Bootstrapping computational costs are prohibitively large when allowing for classification errors in both X * and Y * .
